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Just weeks before the symposium that featured the scholars and
advocates in this Issue of the Fordham International Law Journal,
police in Beijing arrested Yu Wensheng, a prominent Chinese human
rights lawyer as he was taking his son to school. 1 Yu was moved to
Jiangsu province where the Tongshan Branch of the Xuzhou City
Public Security Bureau placed him under “residential surveillance in a
designated location,” a form of secret incommunicado detention in
Beijing. 2 He was never once allowed to see his wife or family, or meet
with lawyers whom he had previously selected and she had hired on his
behalf. 3
Just weeks after the symposium, the Xuzhou City Public Security
Bureau (“XCPSB”) formally arrested Yu on suspicion of “inciting
* Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights, Founding Co-Director, Leitner
Center for International Law and Justice, Fordham Law School; Visiting Professor, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. My thanks to
Morganne Barrett for consistently first-rate research assistance.
1. Yu Wensheng: China human rights lawyer arrested on school run, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42743961 [https://perma.cc/8R95-TUHT].
2. Urgent Action: Human Rights Lawyer Detained Incommunicado, AMNESTY INT’L
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1781062018
ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/EYU2-YVKN].
3. Id.
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subversion of state power” and “obstructing the duties of public
officers,” the first charge holding the possibility of a maximum
sentence of 15 years. 4 The day before, two family-appointed lawyers
had sought to meet with Yu. 5 Officers at the Tongshan Branch,
however, produced a statement allegedly written by Yu dismissing
them and asking his wife not to hire any new counsel. 6 In response the
family released a video that Yu had made prior to his current detention,
in which he stresses that he would never dismiss his own lawyers unless
he had been subjected to torture. 7
As yet unresolved, Yu’s case is as representative as it is
disturbing. More than any other country, China has staked out the claim
for the dubious distinction of world leader in the intimidation,
persecution and torture of lawyers and human rights advocates who in
any way challenge the regime’s monopoly on power. Yu’s career in
part reflects the larger story. He had established his reputation as a
defender of unpopular clients in several high-profile cases in which he
represented practitioners of Falung Gong, an outlawed spiritual
practice in China, as well as fellow human rights lawyer Wang
Quanzhang. 8 He has also been publicly outspoken, among other things,
decrying the deterioration of the rule of law under Xi Jinping. 9 As a
result has been detained and tortured. 10 Not long after he offered public
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Hong Kong Free Press, ‘I will not accept gov’t-appointed lawyer unless tortured,’
arrested Chinese lawyer Yu Wensheng says, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=XD0VYOAPWoE [https://perma.cc/L5TX-XMCG].
8. Yang Jianli, We don’t even know if this heroic Chinese lawyer is alive or dead, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/
wp/2018/02/26/we-dont-even-know-if-this-heroic-chinese-lawyer-is-alive-ordead/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c1eeafe4dc3e [https://perma.cc/L3UL-HRZ4].
9. YU WENSHENG, URGING THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS TO OUST XI JINPING AND FULLY
IMPLEMENT STRUCTURAL POLITICAL REVIEW (2017), https://www.ir2008.org/en/citizenssquare/urging-19th-party-congress-oust-xi-jinping-and-fully-implement-structural-political
[https://perma.cc/HJG3-WTFN].
10. Lawyer Yu Wensheng Files Complaint About Police Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CHINA (Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.hrichina.org/en/citizens-square/lawyer-yu-wenshengfiles-complaint-about-police-torture (translating Wensheng’s account of the torture he endured
in 2014) [https://perma.cc/R6EB-JNMA]; Hong Kong Free Press, ‘I will not accept gov’tappointed lawyer unless tortured,’ arrested Chinese lawyer Yu Wensheng says, YOUTUBE (Apr.
26, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XD0VYOAPWoE (showing testimony of
Wensheng that he would not fire his lawyers unless tortured) [https://perma.cc/FVF6-K5QE];
Detained Chinese Rights Lawyer ‘Fires’ Defense Team Under Suspected Duress, RADIO FREE
ASIA (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/yuwensheng-duress-04232018
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support for the umbrella movement for democratic reform in Hong
Kong, Beijing authorities detained Yu for 99 days, during which by his
account he was denied access to a lawyer, questioned over 200 times,
and painfully handcuffed to an iron chair with his hands behind his
back. 11 He was again briefly detained and mistreated in the fall of 2017
after writing an open letter criticizing Xi. 12
Ill-treatment of lawyers such as Yu became increasingly common
after the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The noted constitutional advocate and
scholar, Teng Biao, who participated in this Symposium, was himself
detained and tortured that year. 13 A significant upsurge occurred, not
coincidentally, during the Arab Spring of 2011, as dozens of lawyers
and human rights advocates met similar fates, a crackdown reported by
the Leitner Center on International Law and Justice and the associated
Committee to Support Chinese Lawyers. 14 Even this response paled in
comparison to mass detentions of July 9, 2015. 15 The arrest of Wang
Yu commenced the mass detention of over 250 human rights lawyers
and advocates across China in perhaps the greatest concentrated
campaign against the legal profession yet seen in any nation. These
events, since known as the “709” crackdown, continue to cast an
enormous shadow. The fate of China’s rights lawyers has already
inspired important monographs by Eva Pils 16 and Terrance Halliday
and Sida Liu. 17 It is also among the reasons Carl Minzner has entitled
130813.html (explaining that Wensheng has recently fired his lawyers) [https://perma.cc/QM9JV4M9].
11. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2.
12. Id.
13. Teng Biao, Atrocity in the Name of the Law, CHINA CHANGE (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://chinachange.org/2017/12/07/atrocity-in-the-name-of-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/B56QN7NG].
14. LEITNER CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE & THE COMMITTEE TO
SUPPORT CHINESE LAWYERS, PLIGHT AND PROSPECTS: THE LANDSCAPE OF CAUSE LAWYERS
IN CHINA 5-6 (2015).
15. A Year on China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
(June 22, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/07/one-year-since-chinascrackdown-on-human-rights-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/GRF7-MLKJ].
16. EVA PILS, CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE (2014).
Eva Pills is Reader in Transnational Law at The Dickson Poon School of Law at King’s College
London. She also co-founded the Centre for Rights and Justice as Associate Professor at The
Chinese University of Hong Kong and has been a Visiting Professor of Law at Columbia Law
School.
17. SIDA LIU & TERRANCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS
OF LAWYERS AT WORK (2016). Terrance Halliday is an Adjunct Professor of Sociology at
Northwestern University, Honorary Professor at the School of Regulation, Justice and
Diplomacy, and Fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific at Australian National University.
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his insightful book on China’s authoritarian revival, the End of An
Era—among other things, the era of legal reform. 18
Yet there remains much to be said, especially as the repression of
lawyers such as Yu Wensheng continue. This Symposium Issue brings
together many of the leading experts, scholars, and advocates on the
plight and prospects of rights lawyers in China.
I.

WHY LAWYERS?

Any symposium focusing on the plight of lawyers invites an
immediate challenge. Why concentrate on a professional elite when so
many more ordinary people from human rights violations that are no
less, and in some ways even more, egregious? 19 Are not lawyers better
equipped, in legal knowledge, education, and connections, than any
other group to fend off official harassment and persecution? Should not
advocates, especially foreign advocates, concentrate their support on
the many who are least well placed to defend themselves, than the few
who are best placed? Does not the specter of lawyers protecting lawyers
at the end of the day reflect concern for members of the club, and so
indifferent to the rest?
The answer in each instance is: No. To the contrary, the argument
for devoting even scarce resources to the persecution of lawyers is
compelling. Simply stated, lawyers matter beyond their numbers, and
for that reason have been subject to increased targeting. This imperative
has a number of components worth unpacking. As a threshold matter,
lawyers by definition possess a “multiplier effect.” 20 Silencing one
attorney not only eliminates that voice, but also renders voiceless any
He is also a Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation. Sida Liu is an Assistant
Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto, a Faculty Fellow at the American Bar
Foundation, and a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.
18. CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN REVIVAL IS
UNDERMINING ITS RISE 23-26 (2018). Carl Minzner is a Professor of Law at Fordham
University School of Law and was previously an Associate Professor of Law at Washington
University in St. Louis. He has also served as Senior Counsel for the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, International Affairs Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations, and
was a Yale-China Legal Education Fellow at the Xibei Institute of Politics and Law in Xi’an,
China.
19. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
CHINA 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2017), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrights
report/index.htm#wrapper [https://perma.cc/L57D-34RS].
20. The effect of persecuting lawyers not only oppresses the individual lawyer, but every
individual who ever has been or could later be the lawyer’s client, thus multiplying the
oppressors’ impact.
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and all clients that the attorney represents, and many more who may
share the same interests as those clients. Governments, China’s chief
among them, understand this, and more and more have been responding
both “horizontally” and “vertically.” 21 One horizontal response has
been global. China is effectively the leader of a worldwide crackdown
against lawyers who in any way challenge authoritarian regimes. 22 The
list includes Russia, Egypt, Turkey, Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, not to
mention instances in the United Kingdom and the United States. 23 A
further horizontal response has taken place within China. Over the past
several years, assaults on the legal profession have expanded beyond a
core targeted group of “impact” rights lawyers, to criminal defense
counsel, tort lawyers, and even to corporate attorneys and firms that
engage in certain pro bono work. 24 Finally, China’s crackdown on
21. Governments oppress lawyers horizontally by targeting not only human rights lawyers,
but also criminal defense lawyers who defend those that the government seeks to punish, and
further, torts lawyers who call for accountability of those including government institutions, and
even wider expanded to private practice attorneys performing pro bono work in the interest of
human rights. Governments also oppress rights lawyers vertically from both directions; police
officers and jail workers implement harsh policies, including torture, while those with the most
powerful positions craft and strategize policies that will allow oppression to continue.
22. Teng Biao, What will this crackdown on activists do to China’s nascent civil society?,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/24/
crackdown-activists-china-nascent-civil-society-pu-zhiquaing
[https://perma.cc/43KDRGYH].
23. Suppression of Lawyers in the Russian Federation, LAWYERS FOR LAWYERS,
http://www.advocatenvooradvocaten.nl/countries/russianfederation/ (last visited on June 14,
2018) [https://perma.cc/7YTY-7QYX]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, EGYPT 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2017),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277483.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9XZ-96MM];
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, TURKEY 2017
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277471.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6RYP-6F32]; Cuba: Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2016),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/cuba
[https://perma.cc/AN78ZSTM]; Human rights situation in Iran warrants serious concern, UN expert reports, UN NEWS
(Mar. 11, 2013), https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/03/434032-human-rights-situation-iranwarrants-serious-concern-un-expert-reports [https://perma.cc/NQL5-7LLD]; No Country for
Human Rights Activists: Assaults on Bloggers and Democracy Campaigners in Vietnam,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 18, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/06/18/no-countryhuman-rights-activists/assaults-bloggers-and-democracy-campaigners [https://perma.cc/7FMFEHZM]; Lizzie Dearden, Lawyers call for strike over ‘relentless legal aid cuts’, THE
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/legal-aidcuts-lawyers-strike-criminal-bar-association-justice-gauke-a8280226.html
[https://perma.cc/JB33-7R7U]; Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, Making Justice Equal, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminaljustice/reports/2016/12/08/294479/making-justice-equal/ [https://perma.cc/2JSX-RZAM].
24. See Thomas Stevenson, The Precarious Lives of Criminal Defense Lawyers in China,
THE ATLANTIC (July 23, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/07/the-
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lawyers has also taken on an ever more pressing vertical element.
Where previously harassment and intimidation came from local
officials, today under Xi Jinping, it appears to issue from the highest
levels, top-down, as a concerted campaign. 25
Consider more in depth first the multiplier effect. Estimates figure
that China today boasts over 300,000 lawyers. 26 In itself that number
represents a stunning achievement. When Deng Xiaoping set out to
rebuild the legal system after the end of the Cultural Revolution,
starting around 1979, the nation had virtually no lawyers at all. 27 As is
true in most countries, authoritarian states especially, the number of
attorneys who regularly engage in rights advocacy remain but a small
fraction. Most estimates range in the hundreds. 28 Thanks in part to their
scarcity, each one cannot help but represent numerous clients on a
range of issues. Take the charismatic Pu Zhiqiang. Among others, he
has represented Tang Hui, who was sentenced to reeducation through
labor for a campaign to rescue her daughter from kidnapping and forced
prostitution 29; Tan Zuoren, who was imprisoned after exposing
government corruption in the poor construction of school that collapsed
during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake 30; Karma Samdrup, a Tibetan

precarious-lives-of-criminal-defense-lawyers-in-china/278049/
[https://perma.cc/S6KNXD2S]; see also, Abby Seiff, China’s latest crackdown on lawyers is unprecedented, human
rights monitors say, ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/chinas_latest_crackdown_on_lawyers_is_unprecedented_human_rights_monitors
[https://perma.cc/6772-Q4ZS].
25. China’s probes of rights lawyers ‘alarming’: Human Rights Watch, REUTERS (Sept.
20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights/chinas-probes-of-rights-lawyersalarming-human-rights-watch-idUSKCN1BV108 [https://perma.cc/XDV3-64T7].
26. Alex Palmer, ‘Flee at Once’: China’s Besieged Human Rights Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/magazine/the-lonelycrusade-of-chinas-human-rights-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/LX4T-PYS3].
27. Id.
28. COMMITTEE TO SUPPORT CHINESE LAWYERS & THE LEITNER CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 30-31.
29. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Debate Rages After Death Sentences Overturned in Child
Prostitution Case, SINOSPHERE (June 13, 2014), https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/
13/debate-rages-after-death-sentences-overturned-in-child-prostitution-case/ [https://perma.cc/
5VJK-3W67].
30. Agence France-Presse, Chinese earthquake activist Tan Zuoren released after fiveyear prison term, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/mar/27/chinese-activist-tan-zouren-released-five-year-prison-term
[https://perma.cc/P57F-A72A].
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environmentalist 31; and the noted artist Ai Weiwei. 32 Pu has since been
imprisoned for “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” 33 Removing
him necessarily exposes his clients, both current and potential. His
neutralization in addition reduces a scarce resource, given the small
percentage of rights lawyers. Moreover, the targeting of Pu also has a
chilling effect on the group that remains. Pu’s fate provides a poignant
example of the Chinese saying, “kill the chicken to scare the
monkeys.” 34
The plight of China’s rights lawyers merits further attention as
part of a global, “horizontal” phenomenon. Hand in hand with the
recent rise of authoritarian regimes has been the suppression of lawyers
and judges who in any way might challenge their authority. 35 Recently,
the UN Human Rights Council (the “Human Rights Council”), rarely
the world’s most audacious institution, condemned, “the increasingly
frequent attacks on the independence of judges, lawyers, prosecutors
and court officials, in particular threats, intimidation and interference
in the discharge of their professional functions.” 36 Though the
Resolution did not specify any particular states, there is no shortage of
candidates in any region. Crackdowns against human rights lawyers
have occurred throughout Eastern Europe, including Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. 37 Recent echoes of deadly
persecution of unpopular attorneys have sounded at the other end of the

31. Andrew Jacobs, Tibetan Environmentalist Receives 15-Year Sentence, THE N.Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world/asia/25tibet.html?mtrref=
www.google.com [https://perma.cc/B9YJ-2CNE].
32. Lizzie Dearden, Pu Zhiqiang: Chinese court convicts prominent human rights lawyer
who defended Ai Weiwei over Weibo posts, THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pu-zhiqiang-chinese-court-convictsprominent-human-rights-lawyer-who-defended-ai-weiwei-over-weibo-a6783296.html
[https://perma.cc/7F7G-GLFF].
33. Id.
34. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “KILL THE CHICKEN TO SCARE THE MONKEYS”:
SUPPRESSION OF FREE EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY IN SINGAPORE (2017).
35. Carl Minzner, Countries at the Crossroads 2011: China, FREEDOM HOUSE (2011),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/ChinaFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TWZ-ZTM8].
36. UN Human Rights Council, Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors
and Assessors, and the Independence of Lawyers, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/L.20 (June 19, 2017).
37. HUMAN RIGHTS HOUSE NETWORK, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS AT RISK: MAKING THE
CASE FOR THE PROTECTION OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS IN AZERBAIJAN, BELARUS, MOLDOVA,
RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE (2015).
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continent, in Northern Ireland. 38 Egypt and Turkey have played leading
roles in the Middle East, 39 as have Cuba and Venezuela in the
Americas. 40 Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar have likewise done
their part in Asia. 41 Restrictions, if not targeting, on US lawyers at
Guantanamo Bay have also been a concern. 42 Among other things, the
UN Rapporteur on the Independence of Lawyers and Judges has urged
bar associations to take up the cause. 43 Accordingly, the New York City
Bar Association established a Task Force on the Independence of
Lawyers and Judges, and has hosted panels on the persecution of
lawyers in many of the states previously mentioned. 44 Yet for scale and
severity, China remains the leader in exactly one aspect of the trend the
Human Rights Council condemned – threats, intimidation, and
interference targeting lawyers. Understanding China’s actions is
important in itself, and in understanding the broader trend.
At the same time, a different type of horizontal expansion has
been taking place within China. Lawyers subject to targeting by a given
regime fall along a spectrum. At one end are attorneys who represent
clients who are perceived as a threat. In China, these “rights,” “impact,”
or “weiquan” lawyers often defend individuals associated with groups
that have shown a capacity to organize, such as Falun Gong, people
38. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, A TROUBLING TURN: THE VILIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAWYERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/

A-Troubling-Turn.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP22-8929].
39. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, EGYPT
2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
277483.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
TURKEY 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
277471.pdf [https://perma.cc/8427-3983].
40. Cuba: Events of 2017, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 2018), https://www.hrw.org/
world-report/2018/country-chapters/cuba.; AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
REPORT 2017/18 393 (2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/venezuela/reportvenezuela/ [https://perma.cc/CL73-A9KJ].
41. No Country for Human Rights Activists: Assaults on Bloggers and Democracy
Campaigners in Vietnam, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 18, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2017/06/18/no-country-human-rights-activists/assaults-bloggers-and-democracycampaigners [https://perma.cc/2HE8-QE46]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, CAMBODIA 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2018),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277315.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA2J-224X];
INT’L COMM’N. OF JURISTS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
MYANMAR: BASELINE STUDY 7 (Jan. 2018).
42. MARK DENBEAUX & JONATHAN HAFETZ, THE GUANTANAMO LAWYERS 109 (2009).
43. UN Human Rights Council, supra note 36, at 15.
44. Task Force for the Independence of Lawyers and Judges, N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N,
http://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/independence-of-lawyersand-judges-task-force-for-the (last visited May 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/P2WD-CZR4].

2018]

INTRODUCTION

1099

who simply have grievances with government decisions, policies, or
officials, or attorneys who have represented such clients and
themselves gotten into trouble. 45 Next come criminal defense lawyers,
whose clients may not be “political,” but who by definition have run
afoul of the government. 46 After these appear tort lawyers who may
seek civil remedies from either State-Owned Enterprises, the
government, or officials, as was true in lawsuits against corrupt
bureaucrats responsible for tainted milk. 47 Toward the other end of the
spectrum are lawyers who otherwise engage in safe business or
corporate practice, but who may take on a potentially controversial pro
bono case. Hovering over all these categories are the law firms that
employ attorneys, and which themselves become vulnerable to
retaliation, even shutdown, as a result of an individual lawyer’s work.48
Rights or impact lawyers present the greatest perceived “threat” and
experience consistent harassment first. 49 How far along the spectrum
the persecution extends offers one measure of how authoritarian a
regime has grown. As this Symposium suggests, China under Xi has
proceeded far along that path.
China’s assault on lawyers of all types also operates vertically. In
any country, such attacks could emanate in a more or less
uncoordinated fashion from local officials. Or they could reflect a
policy instituted by regional or provincial governments. A campaign
against lawyers and other rights advocates, finally, could come from
the top. In the United States, police violence against people of color
tends to be reported as perpetrated by local law enforcement. Then
again, President Trump’s statements on law, order, and race fairly raise
the question of how much responsibility Washington, D.C. bears for
the phenomenon. In China, the responsibility of the Xi administration

45. Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, Climbing the Weiquan Ladder: A Radicalizing Process
for Rights-Protection Lawyers, 40 The China Quarterly 40 (2011), https://www.law.upenn.edu/
live/files/2311-climbing-the-weiquan-ladder [https://perma.cc/6H9A-4KVC].
46. Terry Halliday, Why China Fears Lawyers, WALL STREET J. (June 28, 2017),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/why_china_fears_lawyers_wj
s_asia_28_june_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7KS-BGFB].
47. Lauren M. Katz, Class Action with Chinese Characteristics: The Role of Procedural
Due Process in the Sanlu Milk Scandal, 2 Tsinghua China L. Rev. 419, 447-48.
48. See, Disbarment, Suspension and Harassment: Outcast Lawyers in China, JURIST
(Mar. 30, 2018), http://www.jurist.org/dateline/2018/03/Patrick-Poon-outcast-lawyers-in-china.
php [https://perma.cc/V2PZ-LL9X].
49. For a comprehensive overview, see Pils, supra note 16; see also Liu & Halliday
CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA, supra note 17.
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appears increasingly clear cut. Previously, Zhongnanhai 50 tended to
wash its hands of incidents targeting lawyers, at most claiming that any
such actions were the work of local officials. The Central Government
relied on exactly this excuse in the high-profile case of Chen
Guancheng, the noted blind “barefoot” lawyer. 51 Since Xi assumed the
leadership, however, the top has played a more prominent role. The
Chinese Communist Party has expressly condemned the type of legal
advocacy that weiquan lawyers represent. 52 The hundreds of arrests
that began on July 9, 2015 – the beginning of the “709” crackdown 53 –
suggest nothing if not a concerted campaign initiated and approved by
the very highest levels of government. 54
The multiplier effect, the global phenomenon, the widening scope
of persecution in China, the direction of the Central Government
authorities. The contributions to this Symposium illuminate each of
these elements. Together they also pose, but also help address, the
substantial challenge that the ongoing crackdown on lawyers in China
present.
II. DEFENDING THE DEFENDERS
What can be done against this onslaught, especially by those who
enjoy the luxury of engaging in unfettered legal advocacy abroad?
What makes lawyers vulnerable to attack in theory should also
provide them a basis for defense. As a trained, high profile elite, they
are more than most equipped with skills, associations, and connections
to safeguard their own interests. In a globalized world, additional
assistance should come from lawyers around the world in a position to
advocate for their counterparts under assault in authoritarian regimes.
50. Located next to Beijing’s Imperial Forbidden City, Zhongnanhai serves as the
headquarters compound for the Communist Party of China and the Chinese central government.
51. Minky Worden, Chinese Media Breaks Silence on Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng,
THE DAILY BEAST (May 3, 2012), https://www.thedailybeast.com/chinese-media-breakssilence-on-blind-activist-chen-guangcheng [https://perma.cc/PUU8-P4UM].
52. Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation - How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive
Shaping China’s Current Political Climate?, CHINAFILE (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.chinafile.
com/document-9-chinafile-translation.
53. Statement of New York City Bar Association Marking “709 Crackdown” on Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N (Jul. 8, 2017), http://www.nycbar.org/medialisting/media/detail/statement-of-new-york-city-bar-association-marking-709-crackdown-onchinese-human-rights-defenders#_ftn3 [https://perma.cc/KH8C-9D9Z] [hereinafter Statement
of NYC Bar Marking 709 Crackdown].
54. LEITNER CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE & THE COMMITTEE TO
SUPPORT CHINESE LAWYERS, supra note 14, at 15.
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No less important, lawyers are also uniquely well-positioned to make
sure that the law itself protects their position. Beyond the borders of an
authoritarian state, that should also mean that international law offers
powerful tools for lawyers anywhere to protect themselves and their
relationships with their clients.
The reality falls short. The contributions to this Issue in various
ways demonstrate how an authoritarian regime such as China,
determined to brook no challenges, can undermine the built-in
advantages of a domestic legal profession. More surprising is the
international response. The truth is that here, persecuted lawyers in
China and elsewhere face a double bind. First, international law
addressing the role of lawyers remains inadequate. Either it is binding
and too general. Or it is detailed and merely hortatory. Second, lawyers
abroad show surprisingly little concern for their counterparts facing
persecution in another country. In this, lawyers generally undervalue
their mutual interests. With respect to China, they may well overvalue
the rewards of doing business with a regime yet to be fully committed
to the rule of law.
To all these factors this Symposium therefore presents a
commensurate twofold challenge. Lawyers outside authoritarian states
need to know about the international standards that apply to their
profession, and work to strengthen them. Meantime, they also need to
actually employ those standards on behalf of their counterparts who
need them most, both in China and elsewhere.
Begin with the law. Embattled lawyers, in China and elsewhere,
who look to international standards, soon face a dilemma. The problem
goes beyond the usual difficulties in relying on treaties or custom.
International human rights law in particular suffers from
underenforcement. In states such as China, it can also be met with
pushback, one reason holding the regime to its own laws must always
be part of any advocacy strategy. Yet to the extent that international
law matters, fully half the dilemma for lawyers is that virtually no
binding standards deal with their distinct role. 55 This is not to say that
what does exist is irrelevant, only that at present binding standards do
not go far enough.

55. The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers are not legally binding. See The Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers, LAWYERS FOR LAWYERS, http://www.advocatenvo
oradvocaten.nl/basic-principles/ (last visited June 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VUW4-KQJF].
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Relevant binding law falls short in at least two ways. First, much
of it relies on state consent, either active, through agreements, 56 or, and
more narrowly, passive, through custom. China, like the United States,
has failed to accede to major human rights treaties. Most relevant here
is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),
which China has signed but not ratified. 57 Nothing in the ICCPR speaks
to the role of lawyers directly. Article 9, however, does guarantee an
array of due process rights, including not to be subject to arbitrary arrest
and detention; to be informed of the reasons for an arrest or charge; to
be brought before a judge; and to have a trial. 58 As a signatory, China
may not take steps to undermine the object and purpose of the ICCPR’s
provisions. 59 Such a tack, however, remains attenuated.
By contrast, China has actually assumed other binding standards,
but in many ways these deal with the horrific symptoms of the assault
on legal representation rather than the problem itself. Critical in this
regard is the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), which China has
ratified. 60 CAT absolutely prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment, among the most popular devices the regime uses
to silence meddlesome attorneys. 61 The UN Rapporteur on Torture
noted exactly this problem in a recent report. 62 Likewise, China is also
prohibited from other measures commonly employed in its crackdowns
against lawyers, such as prolonged arbitrary detention, either as a

56. Treaties and International Agreements, BERKELEY LAW, https://www.law.berkeley.
edu/library/dynamic/guide.php?id=65 (last visited June 14, 2018); see also, Customary
international humanitarian law: questions & answers, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS (Aug. 15, 2005), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/customarylaw-q-and-a-150805.htm#a5 [https://perma.cc/MR5H-4QFS].
57. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Int’l Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts. (Dec. 16, 1966); U.N.
Office of the High Comm’r on Hum. Rts., Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard,
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited May 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/N6KE-8NFG].
58. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Int’l Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts. art. 9, (Dec. 16, 1966).
59. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
60. G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984); U.N. Office of the High Comm’r on Hum. Rts., supra
note 57.
61. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rt., Committee against Torture:
Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of China, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHN/CO/5
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbol
no=CAT%2fC%2fCHN%2fCO%2f5&Lang=en (stipulating that torture is “deeply entrenched”
in the Chinese criminal justice system) [https://perma.cc/G9PU-D4MJ].
62. Nils Melzer (U.N. Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/50 (Feb.
26, 2018).
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matter of customary international law or jus cogens. 63 Holding the
regime accountable for these violations remains vital. Doing so,
however, does not deal with the underlying problem of attacking
attorneys for providing legal representation to clients the government
perceives as troublesome.
What does is the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
(“UN Basic Principles”). 64 This instrument embodies the other half of
international law’s dilemma. On one hand, the UN Basic Principles
address the challenges facing Chinese rights lawyers with almost
prophetic detail. Article 1 provides that: “All persons are entitled to call
upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to protect and establish
their rights and to defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings.”65
Article 18 importantly states that, “Lawyers shall not be identified with
their clients or their clients’ causes as a result of discharging their
functions.” 66 The UN Basic Principles also go beyond the courthouse
and stationhouse to declare, “Lawyers . . . shall have the right to take
part in public discussion of matters concerning the law, the
administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human
rights and to join or form local, national or international
organizations . . . .” 67 Most directly on point, however, must be Article
16, which protects lawyers in performing their duties, regardless of
their clients:
Governments shall ensure that lawyers (a) are able to perform all
of their professional functions without intimidation, hindrance,
harassment or improper interference; (b) are able to travel and to
consult with their clients freely both within their own country and
abroad; and (c) shall not suffer, or be threatened with, prosecution
or administrative, economic or other sanctions for any action taken
in accordance with recognized professional duties, standards and
ethics. 68

Unfortunately, none of this is formally binding. Rather, the UN
Basic Principles were effectively adopted by the UN General

63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
792 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
64. Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, U.N. Doc A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
65. Id. ¶ 1.
66. Id. ¶ 18.
67. Id. ¶ 23.
68. Id. ¶ 16.
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Assembly. As such, they are classic “soft law,” 69 much like the iconic
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). 70 They are “legal”
because of their provenance and, frankly, their look. A document
issuing from the UN General Assembly, festooned with the UN
insignia, looks nothing if not official. It also resembles a treaty, or
better, part of a constitutional bill of rights. Yet the UN Basic Principles
are also technically “soft.” The UN General Assembly, of course, has
no power to bind the Member States except with regard to the operation
of the organization. 71 As such the document is technically aspirational.
But not ineffective. As with the UDHR itself, the UN Basic
Principles can be as influential as even fully ratified treaties. Start from
the premise that virtually no binding international human rights
standard, in contrast to domestic law, is ordinarily backed by the
potential use of coercive force. Rather, any influence derives from a
state’s desire to maintain a good reputation, to be seen as a credible
member of the international community, and as an actor that will live
up to its commitments, among other things. That a treaty is binding
simply raises these stakes. Yet all of these dynamics also pertain to
“soft law” standards as well. To take one example, the
nongovernmental organization (“NGO” or “NGOs”) now known as
Human Rights First, successfully deployed the UN Basic Principles
against the UK government for restrictions on access to lawyers in
Northern Ireland. 72 Beyond this practical influence, UN General
Assembly resolutions in particular can also have a formal impact. In
particular, they can provide evidence of the two principal bases for
binding customary international law. The UN Basic Principles, for
example, first provide evidence of general practice given their adoption
with no dissenting vote. 73 They further provide evidence of opinio juris
insofar as they provide a basis for a sense of states’ legal obligation to
respect the special rights of lawyers. 74 All of which is to say that the
69. Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 888 (2009)
(describing that “soft legal obligations are those international obligations that, while not legally
binding themselves, are created with the expectation that they will be given some indirect legal
effect through related binding obligations under either international or domestic law”).
70. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
71. U.N. Charter art. 10.
72. Martin Flaherty, Interrogation, Legal Advice, and Human Rights in Northern Ireland,
27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1995).
73. Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
supra note 64.
74. Id.
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UN Basic Principles would undoubtedly have a greater impact if
codified into a treaty, as the UDHR was rendered into the two principal
Covenants. Yet until that happens, the more they are used, the more
effective they will be.
Conversely, even the most precise legal obligations mean little
unless they are employed. As US Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
Jackson said more generally, “there was worldly wisdom in the
maxim . . . that the tools belong to the [person] who can use them.”75
One would think that few groups are better equipped for the use of legal
tools than lawyers. So it goes – at least in China itself. Eva Pils’s
China’s Human Rights Lawyers, 76 Sida Liu and Terrance Halliday’s
Criminal Defense in China, 77 and not least this Symposium, all
demonstrate the almost incomprehensible courage, skill, and
imagination of China’s rights lawyers and their associates in
marshaling China’s own laws – from the xianfa on down – not only to
defend their clients, but also their profession. That they can do so much
with so few materials in a hostile system should teach and inspire
lawyers everywhere.
So far that has yet to happen. No foreign law firm doing business
in China has issued any public statement, nor apparently has made any
private representation, condemning the ongoing crackdown on rights
and other lawyers. The same apparently goes for any practicing
attorney, prominent or otherwise. To the contrary, consider the
experience of several advocates involved in this Symposium, among
them this author. Several years ago they were able to secure a meeting
with leading partners of major New York corporate firms to discuss the
plight of attorneys in China. 78 Each one expressed genuine concern.
Yet none were prepared to take any direct steps or to enlist their firms.
Contrast this reaction to the response of journalists. Media outlets
around the world typically not just cover, but also take up the cause, of
fellow journalists facing persecution in war zones or authoritarian

75. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634, 654 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
76. PILS, supra note 16.
77. LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 17.
78. Cf. The Dangers of Rights Lawyering in China and the Role of American Law Firms,
N. Y. CITY BAR ASS’N (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.nycbar.org/media-listing/media/detail/thedangers-of-rights-lawyering-in-china-and-the-role-of-american-law-firms-a-conversation-withchen-guangcheng-and-professor-jerome-cohen-presentation-of-city-bar-honorary-membershipto-chen-guangcheng [https://perma.cc/TP46-U8V9].
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regimes. 79 Prominent NGOs comprised of reporters and pubic
supporters, such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, lend a
powerful voice in advocating on behalf of their compatriots. 80
The comparative silence does not speak well of the legal
profession. It also calls for an explanation. The general unpopularity of
lawyers may have something to do with it. Lawyers are a hard sell to
potential donors and outside supporters. As the saying goes, no one
likes a lawyer until they need one. 81 But the real difficulties lie with the
profession itself. Internally there is the problem of segmentation.
Specialization differentiates among counsel who practices securities,
intellectual property, international trade, criminal defense, medical
malpractice, mass torts, civil rights, tax, and impact litigation. A more
general divide distinguishes between commercial lawyers and a usually
much smaller group of public interest lawyers. Too often various
segments of the profession conclude that assaults on the independence
of another – in particular rights lawyers – does not affect them. When
for example the noted Belfast human rights lawyer Patrick Finucane
was gunned down by paramilitaries in circumstances that suggested
government collusion, the Law Society of Northern Ireland, of which
only a handful of around 1,500 solicitors represented “political”
detainees, remained silent. 82 A similar situation now exists in China.
Of China’s over 250,000 lawyers, at most only a few hundred engage
in “provocative” rights work. 83 If the many feel unaffected by the plight
of the few within the nation, the many outside can feel they have even
less at stake. This behavior stands in stark contrast to journalism, when
attacks on the freedom of any one member of the press is readily seen
as an attack on freedom of the press per se. 84
79. See generally COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, https://cpj.org [https://perma.
cc/S7M6-UBEL] (last visited June 1, 2018).
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BUCKLEY, BOOMSDAY 66 (1st ed. New York: Twelve/Warner
Books 2007) https://books.google.com/books?id=F52w3BeNP-4C&pg=PT52&lpg=PT52&
dq=no+one+likes+a+lawyer+until+they+need+one&source=bl&ots=yGX0iHKP30&sig=90f
brmijk1lC-eLn_0wctq6CWQE&hl=es419&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi55uiAydLbAhUrzlkK
HczdDlAQ6AEIbjAN#v=onepage&q=no%20one%20likes%20a%20lawyer%20until%20they
%20need%20one&f=false [https://perma.cc/35QH-XP35].
82. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 61 (1993).
83. See MINZNER, END OF AN ERA, supra note 18, at 76-78, 94, 96.
84. See Agence France-Presse, Donald Trump’s attacks on journalists one of the ‘major
threats to press freedom’ along with Russia and China, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr.
25, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2143274/donald-trumpsattacks-journalists-one-major-threats [https://perma.cc/2UF5-VU3R].
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An even greater challenge issues externally. It is, in a word,
money. The profits derived from doing business in what will soon be
the world’s largest economy come with their own perceived shackles.
Foreign attorneys and firms in China can be all but petrified that any
advocacy on behalf of embattled Chinese counterparts can lead to loss
of clients, connections, and outright banishment. The most common
concern cited at the New York meeting of leading partners came down
to the fear that the Chinese government would revoke their firm’s
license to maintain offices in China. 85 Given the government’s
continuing and brutal crackdown on native attorneys, it would be hard
to dismiss these fears as fanciful. Then again, it is impossible to know
what types of foreign representations might be permitted, let alone what
might make a difference, if nothing is tried at all. Joint, united, or
collective action, for example, might well be worth a try since it would
be that much harder to banish several major firms rather than one. As
it is, foreign firms and attorneys engage in a practice that might best be
described as a preemptive cringe.
Yet amidst this indifference are sources of hope. One springs from
the very type of civil society organizations that China now discourages,
but are free elsewhere. Where foreign lawyers and firms feel rightly or
wrongly too exposed individually, they can address the issue through
NGOs and bar associations. Through these organizations, the legal
profession can and should still work to raise awareness about the
situation of Chinese rights lawyers, work to strengthen relevant
standards, and advocate on their behalf.
A number of small NGOs devoted to the cause already exist and
deserve to be better known. In New York, the Committee to Support
Chinese Lawyers, consisting of practitioners and legal academics,
seeks to make the topic better known in the City’s influential legal
community, issue reports, and host panels and meetings. 86 In Hong
Kong, the China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group leverages its
proximity to the mainland to engage in an array of impressive work on
behalf of its counterparts across the border. 87 As noted, there is no
85. Don Durfee, Insight: China’s foreign lawyers argue case from the gallery, REUTERS
(Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-law/insight-chinas-foreign-lawyersargue-case-from-the-gallery-idUSTRE79307T20111004 [https://perma.cc/7FJ7-M5Q7].
86. COMMITTEE TO SUPPORT CHINESE LAWYERS, http://csclawyers.org/ (last visited June
1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YVL3-SMEA].
87. CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS CONCERN GROUP, http://www.chrlawyers.hk/en
(last visited June 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6YTZ-P57D].
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global lawyers’ NGO that rivals the Committee to Protect Journalists
in profile or funding. 88 That said, the International Association of
People’s Lawyers serves as an invaluable clearinghouse for
information about lawyers under threat. 89 So too does the Dublinbased, Frontline Defenders, which supports human rights advocates
generally. 90
As tentative as individual practitioners and firms have been,
united action through bar associations holds special promise. The New
York City Bar Association, consisting of over 24,000 mainly private
law attorneys, has been especially active. On behalf of Chinese
counterparts facing persecution, the New York City Bar Association
has, among other things, sent missions and issued reports 91 and
advocacy letters, 92 held panels, 93 raised human rights issues with
visiting Chinese delegations, 94 and issued a statement of principles for
firms doing business in China that includes concern for human rights
and human rights attorneys 95 and granted an honorary membership to
the “barefoot” exiled lawyer, Chen Guangcheng. 96 More recently it has
set up a Task Force on the Independence of Lawyers and Judges, which
also raised the plight of China’s rights lawyers personally with Diego
Garcia-Sayan, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of

88. See COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, supra note 80.
89. See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS, http://www.iapl.net (last
visited June 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SV9K-WD2Q].
90. See FRONT LINE DEFENDERS, https://frontlinedefenders.atavist.com (last visited June
1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9CPR-GM7G].
91. Report of The Mission to China of The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, N. Y. CITY BAR ASS’N (May 2010), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/
20071953-ReportoftheMissiontoChinaDecember2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H3T-56VT].
92. See Letter from Debra Raskin, Former President, New York City Bar Association, to
His Excellency Mr. Xi Jinping, President, People’s Republic of China (July 28, 2015) (on file
with New York City Bar Association); see also, Letter from Debra Raskin, Former President,
New York City Bar Association, to Minister Guo Shengkun, Minister of Public Security,
People’s Republic of China (Apr. 3, 2015) (on file with New York City Bar Association).
93. N. Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, supra note 79.
94. See generally Asian Affairs Committee, N. Y. CITY BAR ASS’N,
http://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/asian-affairs-committee (last
visited July 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/K4M3-6PVK].
95. Lawyers’ Statement of Principles Regarding China, N. Y. CITY BAR ASS’N (Sept.
2011), https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072195-LawyersStatmentofPrinciples
RegardingChina.pdf [https://perma.cc/827D-CPNC].
96. Honorary Membership, N. Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, http://www.nycbar.org/about/awardsand-special-lectures/honorary-membership (last visited July 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VN4WGKZR].
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Judges and Lawyers. 97 Bar Associations elsewhere have also been
active, including the American Bar Association, the International Bar
Association, and national groups such as the Law Society of England
and Wales. 98 These efforts are all the more critical given that bar
associations in China itself are state-run.
Another locus for foreign legal concern is law schools. As in the
outside world, law school administrators especially can be easily
dazzled by the prospect of the Chinese market, whether the revenue
derived from LL.M. and JD students coming from China, to the
donations offered from alumni practicing there. But many institutions
do more. In New York alone, the Leitner Center for International Law
and Justice at Fordham Law School’s Asia Law and Justice Program
engages in a range of human rights initiatives. 99 Likewise, NYU Law
School’s United States-Asia Law Institute, founded by Jerome Cohen,
among other things provides platforms for Chinese legal experts,
including lawyers who have faced persecution. 100 Fordham Law
School, NYU Law School, and Columbia Law School have also have
granted visiting scholar positions to Chinese human rights advocates
who either cannot return home or who simply need a respite from the
rigors of their work. 101 That said, before legal reform or advocacy must
come awareness, information, and education. The most basic role that
law schools can play is simply informing lawyers, scholars, and
students about the current situation faced by rights advocates in China.
Exactly this is what the new book launched at this symposium, Carl
Minzner’s The End of an Era, does. 102 Exactly this is what the
contributions to this Symposium Issue of the Fordham International
Law Journal do as well.
97. Statement of NYC Bar Marking 709 Crackdown, supra note 53.
98. Compare AMERICAN BAR ASS’N., https://www.americanbar.org/aba.html (last visited
June 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/G5BG-HMVT] with INTERNATIONAL BAR ASS’N.,
https://www.ibanet.org/ (last visited June 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/G8QB-Q9JB] with THE
LAW SOCIETY, http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/ [https://perma.cc/M2BV-YJ38] (last visited June
1, 2018).
99. See generally Asia Law and Justice Program, LEITNER CTR. FOR INT’L LAW AND
JUST., http://www.leitnercenter.org/programs/ALJC/ [https://perma.cc/ZW4S-JQWL] (last
visited June 1, 2018).
100. See generally, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, N.Y.U., https://usali.org/ (last visited June 1,
2018) [https://perma.cc/3FAN-78LR].
101. See, e.g., Leitner Human Rights Speaker Series: Public Interest Lawyers in China:
Firsthand Perspectives, LEITNER CTR. FOR INT’L LAW AND JUST., http://www.leitnercenter.org/
events/Leitner-Human-Rights-Speaker-Series-Public-Interest-Lawyers-in-China-FirsthandPerspectives/ [https://perma.cc/FKG4-6FT4] (last visited June 1, 2018).
102. MINZNER supra note 18.
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III. CONCLUSION
Perhaps most importantly, this symposium does one thing more.
As Carl Minzner has suggested, the path of reform in China is
ultimately up to the Chinese themselves. 103 All that outsiders can do at
best is put a feather in one or another balance in the scale. By offering
expert, current, and in-depth analysis on the role of China’s rights
lawyers, this Issue necessarily helps in that task. What matters more,
both for China and the rest of the world, is knowing of the courage,
resolve, and zeal of those legal advocates inside China who are still
working for the rule of law and fundamental rights. If this Symposium
does nothing more than highlight this – and it does much more – it will
have made a signal contribution.

103. Id. at 195.

